Information, learning and expectations in an experimental model economy by Roos, Michael W. M. & Luhan, Wolfgang J.
Information, learning, and expectations in
an experimental model economy
Michael W.M. Roos*
Wolfgang J. Luhan
Ruhr-Universität Bochum
Lehrstuhl für Makroökonomik and RUBex
D-44801 Bochum, Germany
*(corresponding Author):
Michael.Roos@rub.de
0049 234 3222886
July 10, 2012
Abstract
The experimental "learning-to-forecast" literature nds that subjects use
simple linear backward-looking models when forecasting in environments
with little to no information about the economic framework. We study
the formation of expectations in a laboratory economy of monopolistic
rms and labor unions with almost complete knowledge of the model.
We observe simple backward-looking rules, but also a considerable share
of model-based expectations using information on the economic struc-
ture. At least for some subjects, expectations are informed by theory.
As in the previous literature, we nd individual prediction rules to be
heterogeneous.
JEL classication: D83, D84, C99, E00, E30
Keywords: expectations, heuristics, anchoring, model uncertainty, be-
liefs, mental models, macroeconomic experiment
INTRODUCTION
In this paper we study the formation of expectations in a simple macro-
economic setting using an economic laboratory experiment. Experimen-
tal methods have been used before to analyze the formation of expec-
tations (Adam, 2007; Assenza et al., 2011; Bernasconi and Kirchkamp,
2000; Bernasconi et al., 2004; Heemeijer et al., 2009; Hey, 1994; Hommes
et al., 2005a,b, 2007, 2008; Pfajfar and Zakelj, 2010; Sonnemans et al.,
2004, 2005). Common questions in these papers are whether expecta-
tions are rational and how the formation process can be described by
simple models. The general result appears to be that expectations are
not perfectly rational. Hommes (2011) summarizes the "learning-to-
forecast experiments" (henceforth LTF ) showing that individuals use
simple, linear backward-looking models in a number of economic set-
tings and that they switch between di¤erent forecasting heuristics (see
also Anufriev and Hommes, 2012).
While being very interesting and informative, the conclusions from
the LTF experiments may not be generalizable to all kinds of expecta-
tions. The particular feature of these experiments is that they consider
individual markets with a strong feedback relationship between prices
and price expectations. The feedback can be positive as in speculative
asset markets or negative as in commodity markets of the cobweb type.
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Not all markets have this direct feedback from an expected variable
to the realization of the same variable. In di¤erentiated product markets,
the demand for an individual producers products is fairly exogenous for
the producer. While there may be negative feedback from the producers
expectation to the price, this situation is better described by learning the
demand curve than by learning to forecast, because there is no complex
dynamic interaction between the forecasts of several producers and the
observed prices that depend on every producers forecast. This means
that coordination, which is a crucial issue in the LTF experiments1, is
not so important in di¤erentiated product markets. Another example
are labor markets with wage setters. A union that has the power to set
wages should form expectations about the general price level and about
the employment response of rms. Both the realized level of employ-
ment and the aggregate price level depend only indirectly on the unions
expectations. Especially the link between the price level expected by
a single union and the realization involves a rather complicated causal
chain.
The crucial di¤erence between the examples mentioned above and
the markets in the LTF experiments is the degree of stability of the eco-
nomic environment in which the agents act. In the LTF experiments
each agents forecast has a strong impact on the market which creates
2
complicated dynamics. Under these circumstances it is not surprising
that agents switch between di¤erent forecasting rules depending on the
current state of the market. In other markets the e¤ects of individ-
ual actions on the economic environment are weaker and thus the envi-
ronment subjectively appears to be more stable. Successful forecasting
hence does not depend so much on the choice of the best forecasting
rule for the current state of the market, but rather may result from ac-
quiring a good understanding of the structure of the economy and using
it to form expectations. Under the conditions we have described, it is
possible that simple backward-looking expectation formation rules are
less important and that expectations are more informed by theoretical
perceptions about the model economy.
Our main objective in this study is to learn more about the way
subjects form expectations in a macroeconomic context which is charac-
terized by the interaction of di¤erent types of agents, weak direct impact
of individual expectations on aggregate variables, and feedback from the
aggregate to the individual level. In contrast to the LTF literature we
are not so much interested in whether there is convergence of individ-
ual forecasts to the same (fundamental) value and the properties of the
resulting dynamic feedback system. We want to study how subjects
perceive the economic environment and how they utilize di¤erent kinds
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of information when forming expectations. For these reasons, our ex-
perimental design di¤ers considerably from most of the cited studies, in
which subjects have only limited information on the lab economy. In
most cases, subjects do not know how the variables to be predicted are
determined. If subjectsknowledge about the economic model is very
limited, it is di¢ cult to learn and use the true data generating process
to form expectations. In Hey (1994), for example, there is not even
an economic model that generates the data but only a simple stochastic
process. We provide subjects with an almost complete set of information
about the model economys complex structure and the option to buy in-
formation about past outcomes and about the actions of other players.
This feature allows us to observe which information subjects use to learn
about the model. Another common design feature is the separation of
expectations from decision making. An exception is a study by Bao et
al. (2011) who study expectation formation and decision making jointly
to see whether the results from the LTF experiments are robust, if sub-
jects also have to solve an optimization problem. For our purpose, it
is natural not to separate decision making and expectation formation,
since we want subjects to form expectations about endogenous variables,
but no strong link between expectations and realizations. The active de-
cision making can foster experimentation and learning, which might in
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turn inuence their expectation formation.
There are models that explore whether rational expectations equilib-
ria can be learned by agents that behave like econometricians and employ
learning methods (see Evans and Honkapohja, 2001 for an overview).
Evidence suggests, however, that experts and economic lay people have
very di¤erent theories of how the economy works (see Roos, 2007; Rubin,
2003) and that lay people in general have poor statistical competencies
(see Tversky and Kahneman, 1973, 1974; Kahneman et al., 1982). In
such a case, models with statistical learning may not describe well what
boundedly rational agents do on a priori grounds. An alternative to the
model estimation approach are simple rules of thumb or heuristics that
guide the agentseconomic behavior, especially when the economic en-
vironment is complex and uncertainty is involved, which is typically the
case in macroeconomic decision making.
The idea that agents use heuristics to form macroeconomic expec-
tations is not at all new. The adaptive or extrapolative models of ex-
pectation formation that were common in Keynesian economics can be
interpreted as heuristics. Those models are common alternatives to ra-
tional expectations in the experimental literature. Somewhat typical for
this literature is the conclusion in Hey (1994) that "subjects are trying
to behave rationally, but frequently in a way that appears adaptively"
5
(p. 329). Another heuristic is the anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) which has been applied to model expec-
tations in Bao et al. (2012). This heuristic might be a way to connect
agentsinclination to use relatively simple rules of thumb with their de-
sire to behave rationally, because it is more exible than standard forms
of extrapolative or adaptive expectations.
Our study is more than a simple test of the rationality of expectations
or of the t of simple adaptive models. While we perform such tests, we
want to generate new insights into the process of expectation formation
in an explorative manner. Our rich framework allows us to study how
subjects deal with complex environments and how they use available
information. We nd that subjects rarely gather additional information
about the economy and form biased expectations. Subjects are hetero-
geneous in how they form expectations. While simple backward-looking
rules are frequent, many expectations can also be explained by other
variables from the information sets. Aggregate expectations are not well
explained by any single simple model.
Of course, the choice behavior of subjects is as interesting as the
formation of expectations, but this is analyzed in a companion paper
(Roos and Luhan, 2008). In that paper we nd that subjectspercep-
tions of the model relationships are fairly accurate, but perceptions of
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other subjectsbehavior are biased. Subjects do not optimize for given
expectations.
I. MODEL ECONOMY
Our model economy has a deliberately simple structure in order to fa-
cilitate the comprehension of the model and its dynamics. Despite the
simple structure, the determination of optimal behavior and the forma-
tion of expectations are far from trivial.
The economy consists of a labor market and a product market. The
labor market determines the nominal wage and the level of employment
and the product market determines the prices of goods. Production is
directly linked to employment via the production function. The economy
consists of three identical industries, each producing a good for which
there is a deterministic demand function. Each industry in turn consists
of two agents: a monopoly union and a monopoly rm. In a sequential
two stage game, the union sets the nominal wage rst and the rm
subsequently chooses the level of employment for the given wage. In the
following, we describe the model in detail. The next section presents the
implementation in the laboratory.
In the rst stage, in each industry i, a representative worker or union
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sets the nominal wage wi. The unions objective function is given by
(1) Ui = 

wi
P
  
Li

;
which is a function of the real wage, wi
P
, and employment Li:  is a
scaling factor and  is the weight given to employment. Since Ui is
increasing in the level of employment, it can be interpreted as a utility
function of a union that cares for the employment status of its members.
The marginal utility of employment is positive, but decreasing. The
additive separability of the arguments ensures that the utility function
has an inner maximum for the given production function and the product
demand function2.
Next, the rm learns the wage level in the respective industry and
determines the industry employment. The prots of rm i are given by
(2) i = piYi   wiLi:
Output Yi is a function of productivity A and the chosen employment
level Li
(3) Yi = A
p
Li:
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The product price pi is determined by an exogenous and deterministic
demand function
(4) pi = Y
  1
"
i ; " > 1:
The aggregate price level P is the geometric mean of all industry
prices
(5) P = n
s
nQ
i=1
pi:
Since P depends on the actions of all workers and rms, it is an aggregate
variable.
The economy is fully characterized by the equations (1) - (5). As a
theoretical benchmark, we derive the equilibrium nominal wage and the
equilibrium employment level for homogeneous rms and workers under
the assumptions of full information and strict maximization of prots
and utility.
The rst order condition for fully informed prot maximizing monop-
olistic rms requires to equate the real producer wage with the markup
times the marginal productivity of labor
(6)
wi
pi
=
A
2
p
Li

1  1
"

:
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Using the production function and the demand function, we derive
labor demand as a function of the nominal wage
(7) Li = A
2(" 1)
"+1

("  1)
2"
 2"
"+1
w
 2( ""+1)
i :
Assuming identical industries, the price level in equilibrium is equal
to each industry price
(8) P  =

2w""
A2("  1)
 1
"+1
:
Substituting (7) and (8) into (1) and taking the derivative with re-
spect to w; we obtain the utility maximizing wage
(9) w =
0@ ""+1A 2""+1   " 12"  2"+1"+1
2
1A "+1" ;
which is, of course, constant. In the experiment, we choose the following
parametrization: A = 8;  = 1;  = 5,  = 4; and " = 4.
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II. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND
PROCEDURE
In order to introduce an element of uncertainty and to require subjects to
form beliefs about the model and expectations about the consequences
of their actions, we gave subjects only the rudimentary information of
a negative relationship between the output and the price in each in-
dustry. We provided neither information about the parameters nor the
functional form of the demand function (4).
Equations (1), (2), (3), and (5) were equal for all industries and
known to subjects. It was also common knowledge that everybody had
this information. In addition to the uncertainty about the model, work-
ers also faced uncertainty about the behavior of rms and consequently
about L and p, when setting the nominal wages. While the relationship
between p and L is relatively easy to learn, the relation between w and P
is complex and intransparent. It appears plausible that real unions only
have a limited understanding how their wage setting behavior a¤ects the
general price level.
The experiment was implemented computerized using z-tree (Fis-
chbacher, 2007) with networked PCs separated by blinds. Participants
were students from di¤erent departments of the University of Innsbruck
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and the University of Oldenburg. Upon arrival in the lab, subjects were
randomly assigned to their role as worker or rm and to the economy
with xed assignments throughout the whole experiment (partner de-
sign). Instructions (see Appendix) were read aloud and participants
were given the opportunity to ask questions before the start of the ex-
periment. During the training phase, participants could check with a
test program whether they had understood how their payo¤s would be
calculated. Only after making sure that all participants had understood
how the experiment worked the session was started.
A session consisted of 30 three-stage periods. In the rst stage, work-
ers had to choose a nominal wage for the current period from the interval
[0, 3]. Simultaneously to the wage decision of the workers, each rm had
to enter a wage expectation for the current period3.
In the second stage rms had to decide, how much labor to employ
(from the interval [0.5, 16]) and to state an expectation for their goods
price. While rms were making their decision on employment, workers
were requested to enter the expectation for the price level P and for the
level of employment in their industry4. The second stage also lasted 90
seconds.
In the nal stage, all subjects learned the realizations of w; L; Y; and
p in their industry in the current period. They were also informed about
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P; the value of their objective function  or U , their own expectations,
and the payo¤ for their expectations. All subjects were asked if they
would like to buy information to be displayed in the rst two stages of
the next period. If they chose not to buy additional information, only
the previous periods realizations of w; L; Y; and p in their industry, P;
and the value of their own objective function were displayed. From the
second period onward, this information was automatically displayed on
the top of the rst two stagesscreens. In addition to this information,
they could opt to buy further information about the market variables
(but not about the expectations) in the form of time-series information,
cross-section information, or both. In case of the time-series option,
they obtained not only the realizations of the variables in the industry
of the previous period, but of all previous periods. If they chose the
cross-section data, they were shown the previous periods realizations of
all variables in all industries. The price of either the time series or the
cross-section was 0.1 "taler" (the experimental currency unit, in which
both prots and utility was measured) and served mainly as a threshold
to deter subjects from constantly requesting all available information.
Two elements contributed to subjectspayo¤s in euros. The major
part was calculated based on total prots or utility cumulated (both in
taler) over all periods. In addition, they received earnings from precise
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expectations (also in taler). Earnings from expectations were determined
by
(10) Sfti = max(1  :5(pt   peti)2   :5(wti   weti)2; 0)
for rms and
(11) Swti = max(1  :5(Pt   P eti)2   :5(Lti   Leti)2; 0)
for workers in each period. Forecast earnings were also cumulated over
all periods and added to total prot (utility).
We conducted 4 sessions which lasted roughly 2.5 hours each. Each
session consisted of 18 participants constituting three economies with
three industries in each economy. The average remuneration was e30
per participant including a e5 show-up payment. In each session, we
paid out the xed sum of e540 to be divided conditional on experimental
performance. After subtracting e90 paid for the show-up, the remaining
e450 were divided by the total number of taler earned to determine the
conversion of taler to euros. Subjects received their payo¤s in private and
in cash directly after the experiment. The payo¤ scheme was common
knowledge and explained in detail before the experiment.
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III. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The objective of this study is to learn how subjects form expectations
if they have a lot of structural information about the model economy.
In this section we narrow down this fairly general research question to
more specic questions for which we will provide specic answers.
The starting point of our analysis is reasoning along the following
lines. If subjects had complete knowledge of the model, they would form
rational expectations. Since there are no stochastic shocks in the model,
the Rational Expectations Equilibrium would be given by equations (7)
and (9).5 In our experiment, however, subjects do not have complete
information as they do not know the demand curve.
An economists approach, which is usually assumed in economic the-
ory, would be to observe the available data and to use it to learn the
unknown relationship in order to understand how the model economy
works. This is relatively easy here. Although the demand function is
not known at the beginning of the experiment, it can be observed both
over time and across industries. Subjects knew that all industries were
identical. After the rst period, they had the option to buy information
about the realized values of the variables in the other two industries, in-
cluding the realized price, output, and employment. This means that in
each period after the rst one there are at least three price-output com-
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binations available that provide an impression of the demand functions
shape. Using the time-series information, subjects can get even more
information after a while. Since the demand function does not change
over time, the history of the experiment reveals a lot of the missing
information. In addition to improving expectations, more information
should help making good decisions.
From a bounded rationality perspective, one would not expect that
subjects acquire all available information in order to learn the structure
of the model systematically. They might not know how to use this
information or might not have the cognitive resources to perform the
necessary analysis to benet from the additional data. Our rst research
question refers to the acquisition of available information:
Question 1: Do subjects acquire all available information?
If subjects understand the model structure better over time, we would
expect that their expectations become more accurate during the exper-
iment. This could be interpreted as evidence for some kind of learning.
Question 2: Do expectations become more accurate during the course
of the experiment?
After examining the use and impact of information, we will analyze
the properties of the elicited expectations more in detail. One implica-
tion of rational expectations is that there is no systematic bias which
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means that the expected value of the expectation error is zero. The
standard test for unbiasedness is to regress the realization of a variable
xt on a constant and the expectation xet and to test for the constant
to be zero and the slope to be one (see Lovell, 1986 for a discussion).
This is the typical test for Muths (1961) model of rational expectations.
Alternatively, one can test for unbiasedness by running the opposite re-
gression
(12) xet = 0 + 1xt + t:
This model of expectations was called implicit expectations by Mills
(1957). If the expectation is unbiased then the null hypothesis b0 = 0
and b1 = 1 cannot be rejected by an F-test.
Question 3: Are expectations unbiased on average?
As mentioned in the introduction, expectations can often be de-
scribed well by simple linear backward-looking models. Standard de-
scriptive models of expectation formation are static expectations
(13) xet = xt 1;
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adaptive expectations
(14) xet = x
e
t 1 + (xt 1   xet 1);
and trend extrapolation
(15) xet = xt 1 + (xt 1   xt 2):
We test for these models by estimating the general model
(16) xet = 0 + 1x
e
t 1 + 2xt 1 + 3xt 2 + t
and testing the appropriate restrictions. The restrictions are 0 = 1 =
3 = 0; 2 = 1 for the static model, 0 = 3 = 0; 1 + 2 = 1 for the
adaptive model, and 0 = 1 = 0; 2   3 = 1 for the trend-following
model.
Question 4: Which simple backward-looking models t the data best?
The main question of our paper is whether expectations are also
formed by simple backward-looking rules if subjects have a lot of struc-
tural information about the economy. It is hard to imagine that subjects
who have some knowledge of their economic environment do not use this
knowledge at all when they form their expectations. While it may be too
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extreme to assume that agents use all information (including information
about the model) perfectly and form rational expectations, it is likewise
extreme to assume the opposite that they do not use any information
about relationships between variables. We analyze this hypothesis of
theory-driven expectation formation by estimating linear models of the
form
(17) xet = 0 + 1x
e
t 1 + 2xt 1 +
t + t;
where 
t is a matrix describing the information set of the subject when
the expectation is formed and  is a coe¢ cient matrix. We restrict
the information set of subjects to those variables that were displayed
on each screen. When a subject had not bought additional information,
only wt 1; Lt 1; pt 1, Pt 1; and t 1 or Ut 1 were displayed. We do
not include t 1 and Ut 1 in the regression model because it is hard to
think of a theoretical reason why expectations should depend on the past
values of the objective functions6. Due to high collinearity between pt
and Pt we only include one of these variables in each estimation. Except
for the price expectation model of rms, this is Pt as the price level
enters the objective function of the unions. Furthermore, subjects also
knew their choice of their decision variables wt and Lt respectively, when
they entered their expectation7. We regress the expected values on their
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on previous value, wt 1; Lt 1; pt 1 or Pt 1 and wt and Lt when they are
already known by subjects. We also include the past expectation of the
respective variable and the past observation in order to test for the simple
backward-looking alternatives of static and adaptive expectations.
Such a general model allows us to test for a purely backward-looking
model against some kind of theoretically informed alternative. Even if
subjects do not use all information and strictly speaking do not form
rational expectations, their expectations can still be driven by theory in
the sense that they use some model information to infer relationships
between variables. Observing the realizations of those variables they
apply the perceived relationships to predict the variables of interest.
Instead of analyzing the objective relationships between the variables
in the model economy in a systematic way, subjects might use some kind
of heuristic. Hey (1994) found, that many subjects used the previous
realization as a starting point and adjusted this value by fractions of
previously observed changes. This nding suggests that subjects use
a variant of the anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic. The adjustment
process might work as follows. We assume subjects to have mental
models of the experimental environment that specify perceived causal
relationships between variables. These mental models are partly derived
from the experimental instructions, which contain all model equations
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except for the demand function. But the information from the instruc-
tions is not su¢ cient to obtain the necessary causal relationships, even
if it were complete. The instructions contain only structural equations,
not the reduced forms. Furthermore, the model is only helpful with
the auxiliary assumption of rational players. For this reason, subjects
modify and extend the model as it is presented in the instructions to
mental models that appear plausible and useful. Mental models are use-
ful if they allow subjects to make satisfactory choices and predictions
that are not utterly wrong. Of course, we cannot observe those mental
models, but it might be possible to learn something about those models
from the variables that help to explain expectations.
Question 5: Are expectations inuenced by other variables and theoret-
ical considerations as opposed to simple backward-looking models?
IV. RESULTS
Information
Our rst research question focuses on information acquisition. Given a
xed yet unknown demand function (4) the available information would
enable participants to learn the shape of the function thereby improving
expectations as well as decisions.
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We nd a rather low demand for information: Only in 26.2% of all
cases any information was purchased; in other words, almost 3/4 of the
stated expectations (and the decisions taken subseqently) were formed
without the use of the additional information available. We nd a strong
preference for the cross section information. In 83.7% of all information
purchases subjects requested either the cross section alone (58.5%) or in
combination with the time series information (25.2%).
Observing this low demand for information the question arises of
whether there is a common pattern in information purchases valid for
all subjects. One reason for the low information requests could be that
subjects consider the information not useful and therefore disregard it
when forming expectations and choosing w and L respectively. Should
their experiences from early information purchases lead them to believe
that the information cost of 0.1 taler exceed the returns, we would ob-
serve a decrease in information purchases over time.
Instead of a common pattern for all subjects we identify 18 out of
the 72 subjects whose information requests account for 67.8% of all in-
formation purchases (Kolmogorov-Smirnov-Test p < 0.001 comparing
the frequency of information purchases). We classify subjects as "in-
formation buyers" if they requested information in the majority (> 15)
of periods. Within this group of information buyers we do not observe
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a decrease of information purchases over time but rather a stable pat-
tern throughout the periods. The remaining subjects buy information
only infrequently without any observable pattern or trend. It appears
that those subjects who bought the information valued them higher than
the costs. But do we actually nd increased earnings due to informa-
tion purchases, i.e. is the value of information higher than the cost?
A rst glance at the descriptive statistics conrms the value of informa-
tion: Both unions (8 subjects) and rms (10 subjects) in the information
buying groups earned above average payo¤s. While the overall average
period payo¤ was 4.3 taler for unions and 2.6 taler for rms, the unions
that frequently bought information earned on average 5.6 taler and the
rms of that group earned on average 3.1 taler per period. Although
the payo¤s are signicantly higher for both types of information users
(p= 0.019 for workers and p = 0.029 for rms in a two-tailed t-test),
we nd a signicant increase in the earnings for predictions, S, only for
the participants in the role of rms (p=0.003 in a two-tailed t-test), but
not for workers (p= 0.128). This result is rather puzzling as improved
predictions of P;L; and p would increase S as well U and .
To clarify the picture we estimate xed e¤ect panel models for St as
reported in the rst column of Table 1, using Driscoll and Kraay (1998)
standard errors to control for autocorrelation and potential cluster ef-
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fects8. The rst regressor is information purchase in the previous period
(infot 1), as this determined the information available when eliciting ex-
pectations and making decisions9. rm is a dummy variable for rms
and accounts for di¤erences in S depending on the subjects role in the
experiment. With period we model a time trend and period2 allows this
trend to be non-linear. A signicant trend in time might be interpreted
as learning and serves as rst observation regarding research question 2.
Table 1 here.
In line with the results above, we do not nd a signicant impact of
the information purchase on the expectation accuracy (St). Firms do,
ceteris paribus, perform better in predicting expected values (column 1)
which might be driving the non-parametric results of a signicant impact
of information on St.
We report a signicantly positive, non-linear time trend for St which
suggests gradual improvement of the expectation formation and can be
interpreted as a rst indication of learning. For a more elaborate inves-
tigation of research question 2 we calculate the relative absolute error
(rae) for all predicted variables (L; P; w; p) to measure the accuracy of
expectations during the course of the experiment. The relative absolute
prediction error (xraet =j xet   xt j =xt) is normalized by the realization
of the variable to be predicted and therefore comparable across the dif-
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ferent variables. Figure 1 depicts the period means for all prediction
errors with the workersprediction errors (Lrae; P rae) in the upper and
the rmsprediction errors (wrae; prae) in the lower part of the gure. A
rst visual examination reveals diminishing prediction errors over time
for all four variables, indicating that subjects learn to make better pre-
dictions over time. Two observations are quite eye-catching: First, the
rms perform better in predicting both of the variables. Second, the pre-
diction of the price (p) as well as the price level (P ) appears to be easier
than predicting the wage or labor demand. The explanation might be
that the prices result from an unknown but deterministic demand func-
tion while wages and labor demand are set by other players. According
to Figure 1 the participants found it harder to learn their counterparts
strategies than to learn a part of the model.
Figure 1 here
In order to quantify and to test the e¤ects we see in Figure 1, we
estimated the relative absolute errors as functions of the information
purchase in the previous period and a quadratic time trend. The results
can be found in columns 2 to 5 of Table 1. The estimation results
conrm a negative, non-linear time trend in all prediction errors but no
signicant impact of information acquisition.
Summing up, we nd that most subjects acquire little to no informa-
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tion when making decisions and forming expectations. If they do, this
does not improve the accuracy of their predictions. Participants who
frequently buy information do indeed earn higher prots. The evidence
suggests, however, that there is no causal relationship between infor-
mation acquisition and performance. The predictions do become more
precise over time which we interpret as evidence of learning.10 This
learning, however, must be some kind of learning from experience as it
depends on time, not on information. With respect to decisions, learning
occurs through better expectations. Those subjects with more precise
expectations earn more due to better decisions.
Unbiasedness
Since we are primarily interested in the aggregate properties of the data
we estimated equation (12) by pooled OLS regressions11. We consider
this procedure as an aggregate of the individual estimations, which are
of minor interest in the context of the formation of macroeconomic ex-
pectations.
Two econometric problems can arise in this kind of analysis. First,
the residuals might be autocorrelated, if there is some kind of adaptive
behavior of individuals. Second, there is reason to believe that the ob-
servations within each economy are not independent, because there is
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one common price level in each economy that a¤ects all workers in an
industry and because all members of an economy had the possibility to
observe what the other members did. While we do not think that there
is strong correlation between the observations in each industry, we nev-
ertheless correct for cross-sectional correlation and autocorrelation by
using Driscoll and Kraay (1998) robust standard errors.
All aggregate expectations are clearly biased as Table 2 shows. For
all variables the F-tests reject unbiasedness of expectations at the 1%
level. A basic condition for rational expectations is therefore generally
violated in our observations.
Table 2 here
Given that most subjects acquired little additional information about
the economy, it is not surprising to nd that in general expectations are
biased. But not even those subjects who frequently bought additional
data were able to avoid bias:We sorted subjects into two groups accord-
ing to the frequency of their information purchases (information buyers
as dened in the previous subsection) and tested for bias in both groups
separately. For p; w, and L the estimated parameters are not statisti-
cally di¤erent between the two groups (Wald test). Only for the price
level P the Wald test detects a signicant di¤erence at the 2%-level.
Subjects who acquired information regularly produced unbiased expec-
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tations P e: Performing the same regressions and tests at the individual
level we nd that of the 36 subjects in the role of rms, the price expec-
tations and the wage expectations of 8 subjects are unbiased. Workers
expectations of the employment level are unbiased in 13 cases and price
level expectations in 6 cases.
We have found evidence that aggregate expectations for all four vari-
ables in question are generally not rational due to bias. At the individual
level, only a minority of about one quarter of the subjects form unbi-
ased expectations. Whether subjects acquire additional information or
not hardly matters for the unbiasedness of expectations.
Backward-looking models
The estimation12 of model (16) allows us to test whether simple linear
backward-looking models t the pooled data. Table 3 shows that only in
the case of employment expectations adaptive expectations as a standard
model ts the pooled data. For all other variables none of the simple
models t the data according to the F-tests13 even though the adaptive
model seems to be a fair description of wage expectations with respect to
the point estimates of the individual coe¢ cients. In the aggregate there
is little evidence for static expectations or trend following behavior. The
coe¢ cient on the second lag is only signicantly di¤erent from zero in
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column (1), where it is positive and the coe¢ cients imply trend-reverting
rather than trend-following behavior.
Table 3 here
As discussed above, a large part of the LTF literature reports hetero-
geneity concerning the forecasting rules. We therefore estimate model
(16) also for each individual and test for the restrictions of the simple ex-
pectation models14. Our results15 show that there is heterogeneity both
across individuals and across variables (see Table 4). For price expec-
tations, two subjects form static expectations, 4 subjects form adaptive
expectations and one subject uses a trend rule. For the 20 subjects that
are classied as "other" at least one of the past variables matters, but
not in a way consistent with one of the standard models. The price ex-
pectations of 9 subjects cannot by explained at all by pet 1; pt 1 and pt 1:
The most frequent model of individual wage expectations is the adaptive
model, followed by the static model (14 and 6 subjects). Again, a trend
rule ts only the expectations of one subject. Qualitatively, the picture
is similiar for the employment and price level expectations of the work-
ers. The most frequent model is the adaptive one, followed by the static
model. But again, for a large number of subjects expectations cannot
be explained by the considered backward-looking models.
Table 4 here
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We conclude that adaptive expectations is the best simple backward-
looking model, both in the aggregate and at the individual level. How-
ever, there is considerable heterogeneity and many individual expecta-
tions cannot be described well by one of the simple models.
Theory-driven expectations
Finally, we estimate models augmented by other variables included in
subjects informations sets to allow for more model driven forecasting
behavior. Table 5 contains the results of the estimation of (17) for all
subjects pooled together. The most important result is that - if we allow
for more informed, model-driven learning - a purely adaptive model of
the type xet = 1xt 1 + 2x
e
t 1 + 
t with 1 + 2 = 1 and  = 0
is strongly rejected as shown by the F-tests in all cases. Expectation
formation in our experiment cannot be described well by a mechanistic
adaptive model, which only uses past information of the variable and
its expectation. For we the restriction 1 + 2 = 1 is rejected, but
no other coe¢ cients are di¤erent from zero (see column (2)). In all
other regressions, at least one element in 
t is signicantly di¤erent
from zero which implies that expectations in our experiment are not
purely backward looking.
Table 5 here
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We again estimate all models at the individual level and classify
subjects into di¤erent groups (see Table 6). If xt 1 is not di¤erent from
one and all other coe¢ cients are zero in individual t-tests, the best model
is static expectations. Static expectations do not describe well price
expectations, but between 6 and 9 subjects use this model to predict the
other variables.
If the sum of coe¢ cients of xt 1 and xet 1 is one according to an
F-test and all other variables are zero in t-tests, the model is adap-
tive. Adaptive expectations describe the wage, employment, and price
level expectations of 4, 5, and 2 subjects respectively. Notice that these
numbers are considerably lower than in the previous section where the
estimation model did not include other variables.
If xt 1 is not di¤erent from one and at least one other variable
is signicantly di¤erent from zero, we call the model anchoring-and-
adjustment model. This model is the most frequent model for price
expectations (10 subjects), employment expectations (7 subjects), and
price level expectations (7 subjects). Wage expectations are formed by 3
subjects in this way. An illustrative example of such an anchoring-and-
adjustment rule is
Let = 0:15
(:30)
+ 0:98
(:02)
Lt 1   0:7
(:15)
wt + 0:75
(:22)
wt 1
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which describes well the expectations of three subjects (R2 = 0:98; 81
observations)16: These three subjects assume that the level of employ-
ment will not change unless they change the nominal wage.
In addition to these heuristic prediction rules, we nd that subjects
often use rules that seem to be driven by theoretical considerations or at
least can be rationalized easily. Subjects knew that there was a negative
relation between the produced quantity and the price of a good. We
hence classify all individual price expectation models as theory driven if
we found a signicantly negative coe¢ cient on employment which was
the case for 8 subjects17. A theory-driven expectation might be that
rms predict a positive relation between wt and Pt 1 because they might
believe that workers want to make up for high price levels in the past by
higher nominal wages. This is a common justication for nominal wage
increases in real-world wage negotiations. In fact, the wage expectations
of 3 subjects exhibit this feature. Workers sensibly expect that there
is a negative relation between the wage they set and the employment
level chosen by the rm. If the coe¢ cient on wt is signicantly nega-
tive in the employment expectation regression, we classiy this model
as theory driven. Since we do not see a simple and convincing story for
theory-driven expectations of P e we do not sort any price level expecta-
tion models in this group. As before a large number of individual level
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expectations do not fall into one of the mentioned categories or cannot
be explained by the estimated model at all.
Table 6 here
We nd that in many cases subjects seem to have used more so-
phisticated models than the simple backward-looking rules common in
the literature. The expectations of many subjects can be characterized
by an anchoring-and-adjustment rule that uses the last observation as
the anchor and some other relationship as the adjustment rule. There
is, however, a large degree of heterogeneity with respect to the method
used for the adjustment and with respect to the expectation formation
rules in general. We do not nd any dominant models at the individual
level which implies that the models estimated at the aggregate level are
mixtures of di¤erent individual models.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Previous experimental research on the formation of expectations found
that expectations are typically not rational and often are well described
by simple backward-looking rules such as static or adaptive expectations.
Another established result in the experimental literature is that there is
a lot of heterogeneity in how individuals form expectations.
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Our experimental design di¤ers from those other researchers have
used in that the subjects in our experiment had to make decisions and
form expectations in a model with monopolistic labor and product mar-
kets. There is uncertainty in our model, not because of exogenous sto-
chastic shocks, but because subjects are not perfectly informed about
the model structure. Nevertheless, they have plenty of structural infor-
mation available and can learn the unknown relationship over time quite
precisely by using observations from the experimental history. We use
this particular design in order to analyze whether in an information-rich
environment expectations are still best described by simple backward-
looking rules.
We nd that subjectsexpectations are clearly not rational, because
the fundamental requirement of unbiasedness is systematically violated.
We also observe that subjects acquire little additional information that
would have helped them to learn the structure of the model. Further-
more, those subjects who did gather the information do not benet from
it. Previous information acquisition has no signicant impact on the
accuracy of expectations. Nevertheless, subjectsexpectations become
better over time, which might be an indication of learning. This learn-
ing, however, seems to be driven rather by direct experience than by
active exploration of the model. Our ndings are hence more favorable
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to heuristic behavior than to systematic learning.
Conrming the results in the LTF literature, our estimated expecta-
tion models di¤er widely at the individual level which Hommes (2011)
calls the heterogeneous expectations hypothesis. Among these individual
models, adaptive expectations and static expectations are quite frequent.
However, the main contribution of our paper is to show that the expec-
tations of a signicant number of subjects are better described by more
sophisticated models taking structural information about the economy
into account. One kind of these expectation models is what we call the
anchoring-and-adjustment model that takes the last observation of the
variable to be forecast as an anchor and adjusts from there using addi-
tional information. For all variables except for the wage, the anchoring-
and-adjustment model is among the most frequently used models. But
some subjectsexpectations are even more informed by theory. Price ex-
pectations, employment expectations and to a smaller extent also wage
expectations are formed in a manner that is consistent with theoreti-
cal considerations. About one fth of the subjectsprice expectations
depend negatively on the level of employment and employment expec-
tations depend negatively on the wage level which is also predicted by
the theoretical model.
Our results t well into the concept of bounded rationality in the
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sense that subjects behave in a sensible way, but fail to achieve full ra-
tionality. Many of our subjects do not resort to mechanistic forecasting
rules that can be applied in any situation, but use structural information
about their environment. This means that they attempt to understand
how the variables in the model economy are determined. However, as the
large variety of di¤erent forecast models at the individual level shows,
subjects seem to have heterogeneous mental models which may be very
di¤erent from the actural model underlying the experiment. Their be-
havior is also boundedly rational in the sense that most subjects do not
explore the model economy in a systematic way which we conclude from
the fact that they acquire little information in addition to the informa-
tion they already have.
With heterogeneous expectations that are based on di¤erent subjec-
tive models in a relatively simple laboratory experiment it appears very
unlikely that macroeconomic expectations outside the laboratory can be
modelled adequately by a single simple model. We conjecture that ag-
gregate expectations about macroeconomic variables are the result of a
diverse mix of models, from simple mechanistic ones to rather sophis-
ticated variants informed by some kind of theory. It is a challenge for
future research to explore the properties of such aggregate expectations
which are derived from heterogeneous individual expectations.
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Notes
1In LTF experiments the price is usually a function of the average price expecta-
tion, so that stable price dynamics require coordination on the same price expectation
mechanism. Whether this coordination occurs is one of the questions in the LTF lit-
erature (e.g., Hommes et al. 2005b, Heemeijer et al. 2009).
2This function may not be the standard utility function in union models, but it
confronts workers with the intended trade-o¤ between the real wage and the employ-
ment level. We choose this particular functional form simply for analytical conve-
nience.
3We explain below, how rmsexpectations were incentivized, see equation 10.
4See equation 11 below.
5Our parametrization yields wfi = 0:523 and L

fi = 2:524  w 1:6fi = 0:640:
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6In control estimations we did not nd signicant e¤ects of these variables.
7With the exception of wet which had to be entered by rms before they made
their employment choice.
8It is obvious from (10) and (11) that St is censored at the lower limit of 0, which
would suggest a panel-tobit-estimation. As this does not change the result, we report
the panel-OLS for both dependent variables.
9 infot 1 is a dummy variable that marks if any information has been bought in-
dependent of the type. We tested alternative models including the type and quantity
of information bought as well as the cumulated information bought up to period t.
These alternative regressors were neither signicant nor did they improve the model
t.
10Decreasing forecasting errors could in principle be also due to an exogeneous
stabilization of the model dynamics. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing
out this alternative interpretation.
11We dropped the rst three observations in order to allow for some initial learning.
We also exclude observations where pe > 1 or Pe>2, as they are obvious outliers.
Actual prices were never greater than 1 and most of these cases are clearly identied
as mistakes, e.g. typos like 55 instead of 0.55.
12We estimate by OLS and correct the standard errors for cluster e¤ects. In the
estimation we eliminate the observations of the rst three periods and some obvious
outliers for the price and the price level. See footnote 10.
13From equation (16) we derived the following restrictions: static model 0 = 1 =
3 = 0; 2 = 1; adaptive model 0 = 3 = 0; 1 + 2 = 1; trend-following model
0 = 1 = 0; 2   3 = 1.
14In several cases the F-tests did not reject several of the three sets of restrictions.
In this case we also used individual t-tests to decide which one of the three models
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is most appropriate by assuming that a co¢ cient is zero if this was not rejected by
the t-test.
15All results at the individual level not shown here are available upon request from
the authors.
16Except for the constant, all reported coe¢ cients are signicantly di¤erent from
zero in t-tests at 5%. The values in parentheses are robust standard errors.
17Other variables can be di¤erent from zero as well as long as it does not interfere
with the achoring-and-adjustment rule.
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Table 1: Information impact and learning, panel regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
St L
rae P rae wrae prae
cons - 2.095 .202 .279 .215
(.365) (.166) (.010) (.031)
infot 1 .004 .159 -.005 .002 -.001
(.007) (.089) (.006) (.007) (.005)
rm .293
(.029)
period .043 -.146 -.014 -.014 -.019
(.005) (.0045) (.002) ( .002) (.003)
period2 -.001 .003 .0002 .0003 .0005
(.000) (.001) (.000) (.000) (.000)
R2 .126 .033 .046 .025 .181
#obs 2088 1044 1027 10441 944
xed e¤ects, robust standard errors (Driscoll-Kraay) in parentheses, **, *
indicate signicance at the 1% and 5% level respectively.
Table 2: Biasedness of expectations, pooled samples
(1) (2) (3) (4)
xet p
e we Le P e
cons .15 .58 1.06 .23
(.04) (.06) (.16) (.07)
xt .73 .64 .75 .59
(.06) (.03) (.03) (.12)
R2 .37 .48 .44 .05
p(F ) .001 .000 .000 .007
#obs 926 972 972 956
robust standard errors (Driscoll-Kraay) in parentheses, p(F ): signicance
level of F-test on b0 = 0 and b1 = 1; asterisks indicate signicant di¤erence
from b0 = 0 and b1 = 1 in t-test at 5% and 1% for * and ** respectively
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Table 3: Backward-looking models, pooled samples
(1) (2) (3) (4)
pe we Le P e
xet 1 .00 .42
 .38 .05
(.00) (.09) (.11) (.03)
xt 1 .54 .57 .68 .65
(.05) (.03) (.06) (.07)
xt 2 .19 -.05 -.11 .07
(.04) (.07) (.09) (.13)
constant .14 .07 .31 .13
(.02) (.05) (.11) (.08)
R2 .345 .828 .706 .125
p(F )static .00 .00 .00 .00
p(F )adaptive .00 .01 .10 .00
p(F )trend .00 .00 .00 .00
# obs 926 972 972 956
robust standard errors in parentheses, p(F ): signicance level of F-tests,
asterisks indicate signicant di¤erence from zero in t-test at 5% and 1% for
* and ** respectively
Table 4: Backward-looking models, individual results
pe we Le P e
static 2 6 8 6
adaptive 4 14 9 9
trend 1 1 3 2
other 20 14 12 11
not explicable 9 0 4 10
Entries are the numbers of subjects for which the respective models t.
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Table 5: Models of expectations, pooled samples
(1) (2) (3) (4)
pe we Le P e
pt 1 .71
(.17)
pet 1 .00
(.00)
wt .03 -.44 .01
(.01) (.34) (.003)
wt 1 -.03 .55 .60 .01
(.01) (.04) (.20) (.01)
wet 1 .37

(.05)
Lt -.01
(.001)
Lt 1 .01 -.002 .68 -.001
(.004) (.005) (.09) (.001)
Let 1 .32

(.08)
Pt 1 .65 2.95 .54
(.38) (1.47) (.19)
P et 1 .05
(.03)
const .16 -.25 -1.68 .19
(.09) (.21) (.83) (.08)
R
2
.424 .829 .713 .150
p(F )adaptive .000 .020 .01 .023
#obs 926 972 972 956
robust standard errors in parentheses, p(F ): signicance level of F-tests,
asterisks indicate signicant di¤erence from zero in t-test at 5% and 1% for
* and ** respectively
Table 6: Theory-driven expectations, individual results
pe we Le P e
static 0 9 6 7
adaptive 0 4 5 2
anchoring 10 3 7 7
theory-driven 8 3 7
other 13 14 8 10
not explicable 5 3 3 10
Entries are the numbers of subjects for which the respective models t.
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Figure 1: Relative absolute prediction errors, period means
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